In the 1950's I set out to revolutionize logic. I didn't succeed (not yet!), but it wasn't for want of trying.
topological notions such as continuity, connectedness, homeomorphism, and exotic spheres, they discuss logical notions such as recursion, consistency, decidability, and non-standard models.
No. My logician friend misses the point. Algebraic topology is intellectually and spiritually nearer to logic than to organic chemistry, say, or to economic history -that much is true. It makes sense to house the logicians of the university in the department of mathematics -sure. But the differences between logic and the classical algebraanalysis-geometry kind of "core mathematics" are at least as great as the analogies on which the logician is basing his argument. ("Core mathematics", by the way, is a recently invented weasel phrase whose users think that by frowning on the expression "pure mathematics" they can make the pure-applied chasm go away.)
Both the logician and, say, the harmonic analyst, look for a certain kind of structure, but their kinds of structures are psychologically different. The mathematician wants to know, must know, the connections of his subject with other parts of mathematics. The intuitive similarities between quotient groups and quotient spaces are, at the very least, valuable signposts, the constituents of "mathematical maturity", wisdom, and experience. A microscopic examination of such similarities might lead to category theory, a subject that is viewed by some with the same kind of suspicion as logic, but not to the same extent.
Ah, there's a clue: the microscopic examination. The logician's attention to the nuts and bolts of mathematics, to the symbols and words (0 and + and "or" and "and"), to their order (∀∃ or ∃∀), and to their grouping (parentheses) can strike the mathematician as pettifogging -not wrong, precise enough, but a misdirected emphasis. Here is an analogy that may be fair: the logician's activity strikes the modern analyst the way epsilons and deltas might have struck Fourier.
Boolean logic
An exposition of what logicians call the propositional calculus can annoy and mystify mathematicians. It looks like a lot of fuss about the use of parentheses, it puts much emphasis on the alphabet, and it gives detailed consideration to "variables" (which do not in any sense vary). Despite (or because of?) all the pedantic machinery, it is hard to see what genuine content the subject has. Insofar as it talks about implications between propositions, everything it says looks obvious. Does it really have any mathematical value?
Yes, it does. If you keep rooting around in the library, trying to learn about the propositional calculus, you will find more and more references to Boolean algebra. That's a pretty subject, one that has deep, hard, and still unsolved problems. The most helpful books that I found were Hilbert-Ackermann, Paul Rosenbloom, and Kleene's first book on metamathematics, the big one; and bit by bit the light dawned. Question: what is the propositional calculus? Answer: the theory of free Boolean algebras with a countably infinite set of generators.
Imagine that you are a mathematician who just doesn't happen to know what a group is, and that, consequently, you go to an expert and ask for a definition. Imagine next that the expert, instead of giving you the usual axioms, starts talking about finite sequences of letters, the operation of concatenation that makes new sequences out of old, and equivalence relations that lump many sequences together. If both the expert and you are sufficiently patient, you might presently learn what a free group is, and then, via generators and relations, what a group of any kind is. That's what the propositional calculus does for Boolean algebras: it laboriously constructs the free ones, and then sometimes, via so-called non-logical axioms, it shows how to get all the other ones as well.
To impose a set of relations on (the elements of) a group is in effect the same as to specify a normal subgroup and divide out by it. The same thing is true in Boolean theory: to superimpose a set of non-logical axioms on a Boolean algebra is in effect the same as to specify a Boolean ideal and divide out by it. (Algebraists are used to ideals, but logicians are more fond of the dual concept of filter. In logic, filters, which arise in the algebraic study of provability, are indeed more natural than ideals, which have to do with refutability.) Group theory may be considered to be the study of ordered pairs (F, N ), where F is a free group and N is a normal subgroup of F ; similarly a general (not necessarily "pure") propositional logic may be considered to be an ordered pair (B, I), where B is a free Boolean algebra and I is an ideal in B.
The parallelisms, analogies, between groups and Boolean algebras, and also between the customary approach to the propositional calculus and free Boolean algebras, go much further and deeper than the preceding comments. Consider for instance "the deduction theorem", which says that an implication p ⇒ q can be deduced from a set of axioms if and only if the conclusion q can be deduced from the enlarged set obtained by adjoining p to the axioms. Dualized algebraic translation: an inequality q ≤ p is true modulo a Boolean ideal if and only if q belongs to the ideal generated by p together with the given ideal. Another example: a logic (B, I) is "consistent" if I is "small" (meaning that it is a proper ideal, not as large as B -not everything is refutable); and it is "complete" if I is "large" (meaning that it is maximaleverything not refutable is provable).
The illustrative concepts mentioned in these examples are expressed in terms of the structure theory of the underlying algebraic system; logicians call them "syntactic". There are also "semantic" concepts, which have to do with representation theory. "Truth tables", for instance, are nothing but the clumsiest imaginable way of describing homomorphisms into the two-element Boolean algebra, and that's what representation theory is always like: choose the easiest algebras of the kind under study, and consider homomorphisms from arbitrary algebras into the easy ones. (A standard, non-trivial example is the theory of locally compact abelian groups, where the role of the "easiest" ones is played by just one group, the circle.) The algebraic analogue of the logical concept of "semantic completeness" (everything not refutable is satisfiable) is semisimplicity (every group element different from the identity is mapped onto a number different from 1 by some character).
I found many of these beautiful, exciting, and illuminating analogies, sometimes only implicitly, in the books I was devouring, I guessed some of them, and a few of them I had to discover myself, stumbling painfully from one blind alley to the next. I was looking for a dictionary, I believed that one must exist, a dictionary that would translate the vague words that logicians used to the precise language of mathematics. Yes, vague, or, at best, precise in a forced, ad hoc manner. When I asked a logician what a variable was, I was told that it was just a "letter" or a "symbol". Those words do not belong to the vocabulary of mathematics; I found the explanation that used them unhelpful-vague. When I asked what "interpretation" meant, I was answered in bewildering detail (set, correspondence, substitution, satisfied formulas). In comparison with the truth that I learned later (homomorphism), the answer seemed to me unhelpful -forced, ad hoc. It was a thrill to learn the truth -to begin to see that formal logic might be just a flat photograph of some solid mathematics -it was a thrill and a challenge.
The road to polyadic algebras
The challenge was to discover the solid mathematics of which the predicate calculus and its special "applied" versions are photographs -to find out what plays for prepositional functions the role that Boolean algebras play for propositions.
If propositions, whatever they may be, are most cleanly studied via Boolean algebras -if, to put it more radically, what a proposition "really" is is just an element of a Boolean algebra -then, presumably, the even more mysterious propositional functions are functions with values in a Boolean algebra. If "Socrates is mortal" is a proposition (or, more carefully, a sentence representing a proposition -an element of the equivalence class that a proposition really is), then a propositional function (of x, say) must be something like "x is mortal". But the degree of complication that that indicates is not yet great enough. Indeed: if "Socrates died before Plato" is a proposition, then "x 1 died before x 2 ", considered as a function of two arguments, should also be regarded as a propositional function. In mathematical contexts functions of three, four, or, for that matter, any finite number of arguments are needed -the number of available arguments must be potentially infinite. (I must keep remembering to avoid the word "variable" here -that way confusion lies.) Very well then: the prototypical propositional function is a function from a domain X (integers, Greek philosophers, whatever) to a Boolean algebra B. No, that's not general enough: it should have been from X 2 to B (for functions of two arguments), or from X 3 to B, or, to be prepared for anything, from X 1 to B, where I is an arbitrary index set, preferably infinite.
What in this model is a "variable"? It is not an element of X, or X 2 , or X I : that's a constant (such as 7, or Socrates). Logicians in their texts have been telling the rest of us what a variable is for quite some time, but they didn't have the extensional mathematical courage that Russell had when he defined 2 to be the class of all pairs. They used a linguistic analogue instead: a variable, they said, is like a pronoun. In the classic proverb "for all h, if h hesitates, then h is lost" (sometimes more pithily expressed as "he who hesitates is lost"), the "variable" h that enters is a pronoun; its role in the pithy expression is played by "he".
Suppose, for an example, that X is a set of Greek philosophers, and that p is the function from X 2 to an appropriate Boolean algebra B, defined so that p(x 1 , x 2 ) has the value "x 1 died before x 2 ". The use of symbols such as x 1 , and x 2 here is a mathematical convention, but most mathematicians would be very hard put indeed to say just what x 1 and x 2 are. (They might say "variables", but they would soon admit that they don't know what that word means.) An instruction such as: "evaluate p at the ordered pair (Socrates, Plato)" makes unambiguous sense and uses mathematically defined or definable terms only. The instruction could have been expressed this way: "evaluate p at the pair whose first coordinate is Socrates and second Plato". Equivalently: "put coordinate number 1 equal to Socrates and 2 to Plato". Again, telegraphically but clearly: "put 1 equal to Socrates and 2 to Plato". The symbols "1" and "2" here have a clear and fixed meaning; they are the elements of the index set I(= {1, 2}) that is being used. They are the "names" of the variables -why not be courageous and say they are the variables? And that's what, in effect, logicians do. When they say "consider a set I of variables", they mean "consider a set I whose elements will be used as indices to distinguish coordinates in the Cartesian product X I from one another". Even after we agree that to study propositional functions we should have a set I of variables, a domain X, and a value-algebra B, and that the objects of study are functions from X I to B, we must still decide which operations on such functions are deserving of axiomatic abstraction. Repeated looks at the logical literature, and introspective mathematical daydreaming, suggest two important kinds of operations: substitutions, which change "x 1 ≤ x 2 ," say, into "x 2 ≤ x 1 " or even into "x 1 ≤ x 1 ", and quantifications, which change "x 1 ≤ x 2 " into, for instance, "x 1 ≤ x 2 for some x 2 ". They are equally important, but not equally difficult; the algebraic and geometric properties of quantification are for most people less well known, and therefore harder.
Suppose that I = {1, 2, 3}, X is the set of real numbers, and B is the Boolean algebra of subsets E of X 3 (or, equivalently, the Boolean algebra of propositions of the form "(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ E"). Suppose, to be specific, that E is the closed unit ball
, and that p is the corresponding propositional function (so that p(x) is, for each x in X 3 , the assertion "x ∈ E", true for some x's and false for others). Then "p(x) for some x 3 ", a possible abbreviation for which is ∃ 3 p, is the propositional function q of two arguments such that q(x 1 , x 2 ) is, for each (x 1 , x 2 ) in X 2 , the assertion "(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ E for some x 3 ". Geometrically p is (corresponds to) the unit ball; what, geometrically, is q? Answer: the infinite cylinder whose central axis is the x 3 -axis and whose cross section in the (x 1 , x 2 ) plane is the unit disc.
Motivated by examples such as this, Tarski and his school, in the early 1950's, began to study the algebra of quantification, and introduced structures that they called cylindric algebras. Similar work was being done in Poland at the same time, some in contact with Tarski and some independently; notable representatives of the Polish school at that time were Rasiowa and Sikorski. Motivated, possibly, by the desire to put forth a perfect finished product, Tarski and his collaborators published almost nothing about cylindric algebras for many years. If you wanted to learn what they had accomplished, you could read the two one-paragraph abstracts in the 1952 Bulletin or you could go on a pilgrimage to Berkeley. Sooner or later I did both.
The heuristic meditations of some of the preceding paragraphs (the ones about propositional functions and the operations of importance on them) are typical of a certain kind of pre-research thinking. That's the kind of thinking that Pontrjagin (probably) did when he examined finite abelian groups, the circle group, the line, tori, vector groups, the Cantor set, and the groups obtainable from them by the formation of direct sums, subgroups, and quotient groups -the kind of thinking that led him to the "right" abstract concept, namely locally compact abelian groups. Aha! (he might have said) -that's it -that must be the right general context -now let's see whether a duality theorem can indeed be formulated and proved in that context.
Inspired by my desire to make honest algebra out of logic, and by what I could learn of the Tarski secrets, I began in 1953, and continued for about six or seven years, a study of polyadic algebras. The name was suggested by the presence or many ("poly") quantifier operators (such as ∃ 1 , ∃ 2 , and ∃ 3 ); the important special case in which there is only one such operator, monadic algebras, is the algebraic approach to Aristotelian syllogistics, and the important degenerate case in which no such operator occurs is the familiar Boolean approach to the formal propositional calculus. The program was ambitious. I wanted to make algebra out of all logic, and, in particular, I wanted to understand the algebraic meaning of the two famous Gödel results, the completeness theorem and the incompleteness theorem. Did I succeed?
All logic and all mathematics
No, I didn't succeed in making algebra out of all logic; yes, I did succeed in getting some insight into how that could be done. I still think it could and should be done, and I hope it will be done, but not by me, not any more; a new idea is needed. It was work, hard work, as far as research goes almost full time work for six years of my life, and, as far as research goes, quite possibly the best work of my life.
The algebraic axioms for existential quantification are simple, but it took me months to absorb them into my bloodstream, to understand them intuitively and emotionally as well as merely technically. I wrote them on a small card, which I then carried in my wallet and pulled out frequently to look at during those many minutes that we all waste every day -waiting for my lunch date to arrive five minutes late, or waiting with my mouth blocked open for the dentist to come back. Is there anyone who still doesn't know what those axioms are? Very well: an existential quantifier is a mapping ∃ of a Boolean algebra into itself, such that
∃(p ∧ ∃q) = ∃p ∧ ∃q
whenever p and q are in the algebra. I lived and breathed algebraic logic during those years, during faculty meetings, during my after-lunch lie-down, during concerts, and, of course, during my working time, sitting at my desk and doodling helplessly on a sheet of yellow paper. On one such doodling occasion I was impressed, again, by the unity of mathematical thought. I needed to straighten out a seemingly elementary Boolean identity, but I couldn't -I was stuck -I didn't see the trick. Just to doodle in a different way, with no directed motive, or so I thought, I pulled out a book from among the ones on my desk -my little introductory book on Hilbert space -and I flipped through some of its pages at random, or so I thought. Bingo!, the pay-off: there on p. 58 of the Hilbert space book was the Boolean trick I needed for algebraic logic, an elementary argument that I would have sworn I had never seen before. (The argument proves that a projection-valued measure is multiplicative.)
The theorem that gave me the most trouble was the climax of [1, Algebraic Logic II]. That theorem was the culmination of the preliminaries that the theory needed, the justification of the axioms; it asserts that the models that motivated the definition of polyadic algebras are indeed sufficient to represent the polyadic algebras that are pertinent to logic. I remember the evening when I got over the last hurdle. It was 9 o'clock on a nasty, dark, chilly October evening in Chicago; I had been sitting at my desk for two solid hours, concentrating, juggling what seemed like dozens of concepts and techniques, fighting, writing, getting up to walk across the room and then sitting down again, feeling frustrated but unable to stop, feeling an irresistible pressure to go on. Paper and pencil stopped being useful -I needed a change -I needed to do something -I pulled on my trenchcoat, picked up my stick, and mumbling "I'll be back", I went for a walk, out toward the lake on 55th street, back on 56th, and out again on 57th. Then I saw it. It was over. I saw what I had to do, the battle was won, the argument was clear, the theorem was true, and I could prove it. Celebration was called for. It was almost 10 p.m., and the grocery store I just passed was getting ready to close. A nasty drizzle was coming down and the puddles reflected lights and looked beautiful. Among the outdoor displays at the grocery store, about to be taken inside, were some scraggly flowers. I looked in my pockets and found 98 cents. I asked the clerk whether I could buy some of those scraggly leftovers for that, and he grinned cooperatively -sure, they cost a buck, you can have them for two cents less. I spent my 98 cents and took the flowers home to my wife. Damp and happy I proposed that we have a beer to celebrate.
The representation theorem was the climax of my work on algebraic logic, but it was not the end. The representation theorem made it possible to recognize the Gödel completeness theorem as the semisimplicity theorem for polyadic algebras, but the algebraic treatment of the Gödel incompleteness theorem (that's the famous one about "you can't ever prove everything") remained to be done. Almost everything I was doing in the middle 1950's had that for its main purpose. Published papers (including I know it's there, it's waiting to be found, and underbrush. The formalism (the free-group-like approach) is dispensable; the question is about the recursive number theory. To my taste that's one of the most brilliant ideas in mathematics, and one of the ugliest and least elegant. I went all through it in a special kind of polyadic algebra that can mirror the number-theoretic technique characteristic of Gödel's proof. The mirror is perfect; every step of the proof can be expressed in every Peano algebra. The conclusion is that the ideal of refutable propositions or, equivalently, the filter of provable propositions in a free Peano algebra is not maximal. It is natural to form the quotient modulo that ideal and to use the language of universal algebra to describe the result. Since an algebra with no non-trivial ideals is customarily called "simple", and since the Gödel theorem is, in effect, the statement that in the quotient algebra just mentioned non-trivial ideals do exist, the algebraic formulation of Gödel's crowning achievement is that number theory is not simple.
Polyadic algebra can do more than number theory: it can "do", which means copy, imitate, mirror in all detail, every applied predicate calculus, and, in particular, set theory. There are mathematicians who believe that all mathematics is a logical consequence of set theory, or, in any event, that that is true of all extant mathematics; I am one of them. Set theory, in turn, is a logical consequence of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. Since it is, in principle, easy to formulate those axioms in the language of polyadic algebra, it follows that the kind of algebras that would be specified by such a formulation, let me call them ZF algebras for now, would be a perfect mirror of all extant mathematics (and possibly of all conceivable mathematics as well).
What's going on here? Using the ordinary language and procedure of mathematics, nothing more involved than groups with operators, I define a special kind of structure -polyadic algebras -and, as instances of that kind of structure, I encounter the ZF algebras. Everything that I did to get there can be mirrored, completely mirrored, with nothing left out, within ZF algebras; in particular I could, if I wanted to, discuss groups with operators within such algebras, and I could, if I wanted to, discuss ZF algebras within such algebras. The latter discussion would stand to the former in exactly the same relation as the former stood to the establishment of the theory of ZF algebras in the first place. The ZF algebras discussed within ZF algebras would be a perfect mirroring of a perfect mirroring of all mathematics. Do you see the Quaker Oats phenomenon -the familiar cereal box with a picture of a Quaker holding the familiar cereal box that has on it a picture of a Quaker, etc.? It's there, and it might give you a feeling of discomfort -are we in the presence of that unpleasant disease called "infinite regress"? I don't know. It doesn't worry me, it doesn't frighten me, but I admit that I don't see what implications the picture has. Is there anything wrong with this kind of infinite regress? Or, alternatively, is there anything good about it -does it provide a view that I didn't even know I wanted to see? I don't know, but I do think that the phenomenon is a lot of fun to contemplate.
Logic students and logicians
Of my three Ph.D. students in logic, I have already mentioned the first one, Galler (1955), whom I inherited from Marshall Stone. His thesis studied the relation between polyadic algebras and cylindric algebras and showed that those systems accomplished, each in its own way, what they set out to accomplish -namely, to represent the "pure" first-order predicate calculus and the predicate calculus with equality, respectively. The last one was Aubert Daigneault (1960), who was my student in a strange sense only, but I am glad he was my student in some sense.
I met Daigneault during one of my Institute years, 1957-1958, when he was a graduate student in Princeton working with Church. What he wanted to do, however, was far from Church's usual interests. In that respect he was an unusual Ph.D. candidate -he found his own thesis topic (having to do with algebraic concepts and constructs such as automorphisms and tensor products). Church was willing to sponsor the thesis, but, not feeling at ease with the subject, he asked me to be its unofficial reader and de facto judge. I said yes, of course, and, when the time came, I read Daigneault's work much more carefully than I usually read theses whose growth I had beer watching for years. It was a good thesis, more in the spirit of pure algebra than my own papers, and I learned a lot from it. It was not all algebra -it made contact with the work of the philosophical logicians as well as the formal ones. One of its accomplishments, for instance, was to formulate a result of Beth's on the theory of definition as the analogue of a known fact in group theory: in a free product of polyadic algebras with amalgamation the intersection of the factors is precisely the amalgamated part. I was impressed. I wrote a careful and detailed critique for Church's use, and Daigneault's, and, with less pain than usual, I could add one more name to my list of disciples.
Sometimes a student chooses a Ph.D. supervisor for the "wrong" reason and then finds himself (perhaps to his own pleasant surprise) doing something quite different from what he expected. That's what happened to Leon Le Blanc, my only real allmy-own logic student. I gave a lecture at the University of Montreal once, and this bright young man was introduced to me. He was the best student in their real variable course that year, he enjoyed measure theory and had even made a small publishable observation about it -I was a known measure-theorist, so could he come to Chicago to work with me? Sure, I said, why not.
A few months later, when he finished his undergraduate work, Leon came to Chicago, but of course he wasn't ready to start a thesis -there was a lot of mathematics to learn first, courses to take, requirements to satisfy. By the time he was ready for a thesis, I wanted to have nothing to do with measure theory -I was deeply embedded in polyadic algebras. Result: Leon wrote a thesis on polyadic algebras. The change was not as abrupt as the telling of it, and the change was voluntary on his part. He first knew about me as the author of the book he studied in Montreal; when we met and got to like each other he came to know me in a different capacity, and my interest in and enthusiasm for algebraic logic rubbed off on him. He wasn't making a sacrifice: he was swimming with the stream. Besides (as I often tell advisees) what you write your thesis about doesn't commit you to a lifetime contract. You spend a couple of years on your thesis, and you had better not try to do anything else during those years -but once they are finished, you can (and you should!) do something else.
Leon's thesis was about non-homogeneous polyadic algebras. The idea is that the set of "variables" comes divided into different "sorts" intended to vary over different parts of the structure under study. Thus, for example, in Peano arithmetic some of the variables might be used for integers and others for sets of integers, and in pure second-order logic there might be "individual" variables and "functional" variables. Leon extended a substantial part of polyadic theory to non-homogeneous algebras, and then, instead of going on to do something else, continued to work on algebraic logic for several years. He stayed with the subject till his untimely death (from a brain tumor) and made lasting contributions to it.
I kept trying to spread the gospel not only among my own Ph.D. students, but everywhere I could, every chance I got. I spent two quarters in Berkeley and gave a series of lectures on polyadic algebras. For some reason (curiosity?, courtesy?) Gerhard Hochschild was a faithful attendant. During the same terms he was lecturing on Lie groups and, of course, I was one of his most faithful attendants. A little later I gave a course on algebraic logic in Chicago. It was a surprisingly large class, considering the subject -it had 17 students. Moe Hirsch was one of them (a topologist of renown), as was Jack Towber (an algebraic number theorist), and Mike Morley (the only pro in the lot -a genuine logician).
There weren't many conferences, jamborees, colloquia, and workshops in those days, and the few that existed were treasured. The AMS Summer Institutes were especially effective and prestigious, and I decided that it would be nice to have one in logic, especially if it were at least partly algebraic. It was a brash decision. I had no stature as a logician, I had no clout, I wasn't a member of the in-group; all I had was the brass (willingness to stick my neck out) and the drive (willingness to do the spade work). I phoned Tarski, I phoned Kleene, I phoned Rosser; I made up lists of names and lists of subjects; I wrote circular letters, I tried to design plausible budgets, and I filled out application forms. It worked, because Tarski's and Kleene's and Rosser's fame and high standards made it work -but I started it and I was proud and glad when it worked. It was a great summer in Ithaca in 1957. About 75 or 80 people participated in the Summer Institute, including Michael Rabin (who spoke about finite automata), Haskell Curry (who spoke about combinatory logic -what else?), Georg Kreisel (Gödel's interpretation of Heyting's arithmetic), and Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam (who reported on joint work on Hilbert's 10th problem). I talked about polyadic algebras (what else?), and the short summary of my talk in the Proceedings volume of that Summer Institute is, in fact, the only publication in which I gave some technical clues to my hopes and dreams about Peano algebras.
